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This working paper on “The Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty:
Options for India”, is part of an integrated study of the technical
and security aspects of selected nuclear treaties, conventions
and agreements being carried out at NIAS. The subject of the
present study is an important item in the global nuclear agenda.
Further work on this project will deal not only with important
treaties but also the linkages between them, often not so apparent.
The project was supported by the Board of Research in Nuclear
Sciences of the Department  of Atomic Energy, Mumbai.
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Introduction
Fissile material cut-off was first proposed as a U.S-U.S.S.R
arms control measure by President D. Eisenhower in 1956*
but was rejected by U.S.S.R., since it felt that it was an
American tactic to freeze them at an inferior level. In the
intervening years, between 1956 and January 1989 when
President Mikhail Gorbachev was willing to discuss the
proposal, several developments took place (Annex-1), and
attempts were made to stop production of fissile material but
without any success. Despite the new Russian flexibility under
Gorbachev, however, the Bush administration was opposed to
the idea, most likely due to the U.S.S.R.’s nuclear stockpile
being higher than that of the U.S. Indeed until 1993, the U.S.
remained an opponent to cut-off when President Clinton revised
the policy position from “opposition” to “advocacy.” In
December 1993, the United Nations General Assembly
(UNGA) passed a consensus resolution for negotiating a “non-
discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively
verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for
nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.”1  The
Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) is currently one of the
most important items on the global nuclear agenda but yet the
progress of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament
(CD) has been highly unsatisfactory due to various reasons
including:
1. Assigning a higher priority to Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT) negotiations till 1996.
2. Debate on whether the cut-off should be prospective or
retrospective.
3. Linkage to time-bound disarmament.
4. Concern over freezing stocks at different levels.
5. Lack of clarity on control, accounting and verification
regime.
In August 1998, the CD agreed to establish an ad hoc
committee on the basis of the 1995 Shannon Report2  and its
mandate in line with the December 1993 UNGA resolution.
Obstacles to the resumption of discussions are reported to
have been overcome with Pakistan’s announcement at the July
30th Session of the CD that it would participate in the
negotiations. This decision was presumably taken after
discussions with U.S. earlier in July 1998. India too had by
then already conveyed its decision to participate in the
negotiations. Israel, it is understood, opposes any international
inspection of its facilities and a FMCT which would include* The idea of cut-off was first presented under the atoms for peace conference in 1953
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stockpiles (retrospective). Despite this, Israel has agreed to
join the negotiations at the request of the U.S. The U.S.
argument is that Israel should support the establishment of the
ad hoc committee which may be considered a procedural step,
notwithstanding the fundamental problems mentioned above
that it had expressed. It should be noted that Israel was not a
member of the CD at the time of the 1995 Shannon Report.
Moreover, the U.S. had also expressed the view that
participation by itself would not mean that Israel is taking a
position on the Treaty and its contents.
On 20 August 1998, Ambassador Mark Moher of Canada was
appointed as the Chairman of the ad hoc committee and two
meetings were held before the close of the September 1998
Session. The end result was that the committee was not able
to recommend to the CD that it can continue with Ambassador
Moher as Chairman for the 1999 Session3 . The developments
in 1998 point towards a stalemate.
The CD deliberations at the commencement of the 1999
Session indicate that the stalemate still remains unresolved.
While the U.S. stated that the treaty verification should be
under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) and should focus on “material produced after the
treaties cut-off date,”4  Egypt was of the view that no treaty or
convention could imply acceptance for the “indefinite
possession of nuclear weapons by the five nuclear weapon
states specified in the NPT”5 . In addition, Egypt reiterated
strongly that the treaty’s scope “should include all fissile
materials potentially usable in the manufacture of nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices across the world,
including the military stocks possessed by all the states on an
equal footing”6 . Several non-aligned states raised the issue of
time-bound nuclear disarmament, with Peru stating that “we
should not stabilise indefinite management of nuclear arsenals,
requiring an indefinite struggle against nuclear weapons”.7
All this go to prove that FMCT is still in a stalemate and the
process of negotiations is bound to be prolonged and arduous.
In a position reminiscent of the CTBT, the U.S. has reversed
its earlier stand and is now in the forefront of calling for a ban
on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. The
stated objectives are 8 :
(a) A verified ban on production to cap or constrain the NPT
non- signatories (India, Pakistan and Israel).
(b) Strengthening non-proliferation regime by subjecting to
safeguard all facilities producing fissile material in all
states. In principle, this would be a move towards non-
discriminatory application of safeguards to all states
including the so-called weapon-states.
(c) Non-production of fissile materials, which would cut-off
availability of the same for future production of weapons
and as such would result in freezing of the arsenals.
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India had indicated in the past that it would consider supporting
such a Treaty, but there appears to be a policy change on this
position in the context of developments that took place during
and after CTBT negotiations. However, in a recent official
statement, India has agreed to participate in the FMCT
negotiations at the CD, presumably without any preconditions.
In this context, it is important that India should provide a
cogent and persuasive argument consistent with its national
interests, well in advance of any Treaty negotiations, so as to
avoid some of the difficulties experienced during the CTBT
negotiations and its final outcome. It is important to understand
and absorb the history of past negotiations of important
agreements such as chemical weapons convention, CTBT, and
others, and at the political level, the objectives must be clearly
established without any confusion between strategy and tactics,
if India is to succeed in its efforts towards achieving a Nuclear
Weapon Free World (NWFW).9
Purpose of Study
This study is the first Report of a comprehensive analysis of a
variety of important nuclear treaties and agreements and their
linkages and implications for India, being undertaken by the
National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bangalore. The purpose
of this Report on the FMCT is to analyse various options and
formulate recommendations to serve as an aid to policy
initiatives. The methodology involves analysing both benefits
and risks of each option in the context of national security in
particular.
Prior to taking up the analysis of options, the study provides
the broad context within which to view the FMCT. The first
section provides a summary of the evolution of the FMCT.
The second looks at the FMCT’s role in the global non-
proliferation and disarmament regimes. The third section
focuses on key international and regional players in the nuclear
arena and their positions on the FMCT. The fourth section
turns to an overview of the Indian situation vis-a-vis the FMCT,
and tries to identify the most critical issues facing India in this
regard. Subsequently, an analysis of the options for India on
the FMCT is presented.
I. Evolution of the FMCT
Fissile materials are not only the most important and essential
ingredients of all nuclear weapons but also the most difficult
and expensive part of a nuclear warhead to produce. The
possibility of a cut-off in the production of fissile materials
for weapons use, or other explosive purposes, has been raised
for international consideration numerous times in the past,
beginning immediately after the dropping of the atomic bombs
on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. The first of these
efforts was the Baruch Plan which emanated from the U.S.
designed Acheson-Lilenthal Report of 1946.
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The Baruch Plan envisaged the setting up of an International
Atomic Energy Control Agency which would be entrusted
with managerial oversight and control of all potentially
dangerous atomic energy activities. All states would be under
an intrusive inspection system. Rejecting the Baruch Plan as
interfering with national sovereignty, the Soviet Union offered
a rejoinder with the Gromyko Plan which prohibited the
production and use of atomic weapons and destruction of all
atomic weapons within a period of three months. The Soviet
objection to the U.S. led Baruch Plan was that it would begin
the international control of atomic material before existing
weapons were to be destroyed, which would effectively
privilege the United States. It is ironical that in the post-cold
war era, CTBT and FMCT are once again thrust on the world
without a commitment to time-bound disarmament, which
would once again privilege the U.S. in particular and the P5
states in general. The only defence the U.S. has now is its
proclamation that disarmament is separately addressed through
START treaties.
Although the Baruch Plan failed, U.S. President Dwight
Eisenhower took the initiative in promoting the widespread
peaceful uses of atomic energy in 1953 with the “Atoms for
Peace” speech to the UNGA. His plan was to promote
disarmament by an indirect approach - that of building up the
peaceful uses of atomic energy. In 1954, the U.S. Atomic
Energy Act led to numerous bilateral agreements for sharing
nuclear technology and materials with other states provided
they were used only for civilian purposes and safeguarded. In
1956, the IAEA was established within the U.N. system to
regulate peaceful nuclear research and co-operation, as well
as provide assistance for the supply of nuclear materials,
facilities and technology transfer. As stated earlier, Eisenhower
in 1956 had proposed a ban on production of fissionable
material for weapons, but this was predictably rejected by
U.S.S.R. as a tactic to freeze it in a quantitatively inferior
position. It is clear that such a situation would not arise between
U.S. and Russia in the current case of FMCT, but there are
other countries which feel that they are being capped in an
inferior position, for example Pakistan below India, India below
China and China below U.S. It is the opinion of many
concerned that the large disparities in fissile material stockpiles
could result in a serious obstacle to a global cut-off agreement.
Subsequent to Eisenhower’s 1956 proposal, both U.S. and
U.S.S.R. made in 1964 unilateral policy statements regarding
their intent to reduce their production of fissile materials. But
it was not until early 1980s that more concerted action on this
was evident. The Second Special Session on Disarmament
was held in 1982, in which countries such as Mexico, Sweden
and India strongly called for a “nuclear freeze” by the
superpowers, including a complete cut-off in the production
of weapon grade material.10 This resolution was tabled year
after year without any results. Among three resolutions passed
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in the U.N. in 1983 relating to the freeze was the appeal to the
CD to seek a cut-off in the production of fissile material.
India introduced an important resolution in 1983 urging all
nuclear weapon states to move towards simultaneous and total
stoppage of any further production of nuclear weapons and a
complete cut-off in the production of fissionable material for
weapon purposes. In 1988, the Indian resolution merged with
a Mexican resolution which also included a comprehensive
test ban on nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles along
with a ban on all further deployment of nuclear weapons and
their delivery vehicles.11 Since these resolutions primarily
targeted the nuclear weapons states, little support was
forthcoming from the key global players.
It was nearly ten years later (December 1993, after the end of
the cold war) that the UNGA finally passed the key consensus
resolution in favour of a fissile material cut-off treaty. Apart
from calling for multilateral negotiations to ban fissile material
production for weapons, the resolution permits its use for
civilian purposes and non-explosive military use such as naval
propulsion. This resolution was preceded by the Clinton
administration’s announcement in September 1993 of a
proposal for a global convention banning production of fissile
material for weapons and a voluntary offer to put U.S. excess
fissile material under IAEA safeguards. In March 1995, the
CD began the process of moving seriously towards FMCT by
appointing an ad hoc committee under the leadership of
Ambassador Gerald Shannon of Canada as the Special Co-
ordinator. The CD’s last meeting under Shannon relating to
the FMCT took place in May 1998 without reaching any
agreement.
II. The FMCT and Global Disarmament/Non-proliferation
Regimes
The new found enthusiasm of the U.S. for the FMCT needs to
be seen in the context of its revised nuclear non-proliferation
objectives in the post-cold war era. In a departure from the
Reagan/Bush years, President Bill Clinton has used both liberal
internationalist ideology and hard headed American national
interest to assign primary importance to non-proliferation
objectives.
One of the motivations for this is most likely the so-called
“military-technical revolution” which has occurred in defence
industrialism and America’s marked lead in it.12  The
unchallenged supremacy in precision guided munitions and
electronic warfare that the U.S. enjoys (as demonstrated during
the Persian Gulf war in 1991) has rendered it feasible and
even desirable for the U.S. to consider elimination of nuclear
weapons since that would leave it in an overwhelmingly
favourable position in conventional weapons vis-a-vis others.
In the most advanced conventional military technologies and
logistics, some experts suggest that the U.S. could become a
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near monopolist by the next century. This is in contrast to
nuclear weapons which can be used to “equalise” power in an
otherwise highly unequal international system.
But a more important motivation may be that, as in the case
of nuclear testing, the U.S. and Russia have reached a point of
plutonium (Pu) production where any addition is simply not
necessary for military purposes. The U.S. decided to freeze its
production of fissile material for weapons purposes in July
1992. Globally speaking, there is a glut of fissile material
which is in addition to the existing glut of low enriched
uranium.13
With the break up of the Soviet Union and the perception of
the danger of uncontrolled spread of fissile material in its
aftermath, the Americans are now taking the lead on gaining
approval for the FMCT. There is also some move to
“internationalise” and utilize the experience from the U.S.-
Russian negotiations to control and dispose of fissile material
from dismantled weapons according to the START agreements.
Among several disposition options such as use as fuel in
reactors, vitrification, nuclear explosion in underground cavity,
disposal in space and so forth, ultimately the options hotly
debated are :
(a) To immobilise and store. The process would involve
addition of highly radioactive wastes making it difficult
for stealing or for use in weapons.
(b) Convert weapons Pu to Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel for use
in civilian reactors for energy generation in a “once
through mode.”
At the present moment, there is an interim decision by U.S.
for converting a smaller percentage of Pu for use as MOX
fuel, the remaining to be immobilised and stored. The main
objections to conversion to usable MOX fuel are once again
the proliferation concern and the cost of setting up MOX
fabrication facilities. Moreover, the irradiated MOX will have
a higher Pu content in spent fuel. Since Pu will be handled in
MOX conversion facilities, there is the possibility of
clandestine diversion. But the argument does not seem to hold
good, since the FMCT regime will place all such facilities
under comprehensive safeguards. Moreover, reprocessing
cannot be banned due to the fact that the use of fissile material
for non-weapons use would actually be permitted. The best
policy, hence, would be to put all weapons-dismantled Pu to
peaceful use and rid the world of weapons Pu rather than
stockpiling and protecting for generations, which will involve
huge expenditure.
U.S. has signed a five year agreement with Russia on the
management of excess Pu from dismantled weapons which
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involves co-operation in small scale tests and demonstration
of Pu disposal technologies. As a further step, the two states
have also identified about 50 metric tonnes of excess weapons
Pu to be converted either to MOX fuel or stored as waste after
immobilising. One other issue of importance is the decision
with regard to setting up of MOX plants in U.S. and Russia
involving considerable expenditure. The proposal of burning
MOX fuel in European reactors seems to have been given up
since the expected support from France, Germany and others
is not forthcoming. The lack of a decision on this issue, it
appears, is leading to a demand that the rate of weapons
dismantlement and rate of Pu disposition should be matched
in such a way that the risk of diversion and theft is minimised,
if not totally eliminated. The rate of dismantlement and
disposition has a strong linkage to time-bound disarmament
and any delay would be counterproductive.
Despite whatever has been said above, Russia appears to favour
converting Pu to a usable form and not to treat it as waste.
France, which is the promoter of Fast Breeder Technology
and one of the leading MOX users, does not support treating
Pu as waste. U.K.’s position is not clear but since it operates
and provides reprocessing services, it is not likely to agree to
treat Pu as waste. The Chinese would opt for conversion to
MOX since they too have a Breeder Programme and their
internal resources of uranium are limited as in the case of
India.
In this context, the case of spent fuel also needs to be discussed.
As India protected its interest on spent fuel while negotiating
the Nuclear Waste Convention, it has to make sure that spent
fuel as it exists is considered as stock and can be reprocessed.
Whether spent fuel awaiting reprocessing would be considered
as stock for the purpose of application of treaty stipulation or
not is still not clear, and this will have a serious implication
for India which has a fairly large stockpile of reactor spent
fuel awaiting reprocessing constrained by reprocessing capacity.
The problems with Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) are not
that serious since it can be diluted in terms of enrichment by
blending with natural, depleted or slightly enriched uranium
and used as reactor fuel. A contract to buy about 500 tonnes
of HEU was signed in 1993 between U.S. and Russia with the
understanding that blending down for use in reactors would
be carried out in Russia. It is understood that through the year
1997, about 1038 tonnes of Low Enriched Uranium (LEU)
derived from 36 tonnes of HEU, equivalent to about 1600
nuclear warheads, had been shipped to U.S. from Russia. It is
also understood that this deal has run into some rough weather
due to U.S. stopping payment in 1996 for the natural uranium
component, and instead offering to return an equal amount of
natural uranium. This has been further aggravated by the
decision of the privatised U.S. Enrichment Corporation to deal
at the price Russia put on the natural uranium. As a reaction
to this, “draft legislation had been introduced in the Russian
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State Duma, calling for the suspension of the 1993 agreement
on the grounds that the U.S. had breached it by its 1996
decision.”14  This is bound to have an impact on the Duma
ratifying the START II Treaty. Whatever be the ultimate
decision, there has to be a balance between security concerns,
safety and economics.
The non-proliferation/disarmament link is proving to be as
elusive for the FMCT as it was for the CTBT. Several important
countries in the non-aligned movement are keen on making
the link more explicit and time-bound. The May 1995 indefinite
extension of the NPT and the September 1996 passage of the
CTBT, both without gaining any genuine disarmament
commitment on the part of the nuclear weapons states, however
cast serious doubts whether it will be any different for the
FMCT.
III. Key Actors and the FMCT
As in the case of the CTBT, the key actors would be the P5
states and the Non-signatories to NPT (Israel, India and
Pakistan). While the P5 stopped producing fissile material for
weapons use, China is an exception in the sense that there is
no official declaration of stoppage. In the case of Israel, India
and Pakistan, it is a known fact that unsafeguarded fissile
material is being produced and the recent tests by India and
Pakistan are clear indicators of its use in weapons. Though
Israel has not tested a bomb yet, its capability and readiness to
deploy nuclear weapons is well known.
Russia is not placed in a very different situation from U.S.
with regard to FMCT. Their stockpile of Pu and HEU is
significant, despite the fact that a large quantity of both have
been bought over by U.S. on grounds of security, especially
the possibility of terrorists getting access. FMCT would hence
receive the support of Russians, but their attitude to
comprehensive safeguards, which would reveal their weakness
in terms of safety, material control and accounting, is difficult
to foresee. One other important factor is that START II is still
not ratified by the Duma, which is an indicator of Russia’s
concern at NATO expansion and the possible loss of superior
conventional power status, pushing them to hang on to nuclear
weapons as a balancing act. The U.S. has no such compulsions.
France and U.K. are likely to support FMCT as they did in the
case of CTBT. In the case of China, the present indications
are that FMCT would be supported. Israel has a stockpile of
fissile material and has signed CTBT though not NPT. This
clearly indicates the serious possibility of Israel already
possessing nuclear weapons. Israel is hence likely to fall in
line with the group of adherents subject to the condition that
the treaty would be applied prospectively to fissile material
production and that safeguards will be non-discriminatory. In
the case of India and Pakistan which have demonstrated their
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nuclear weapons capability, Pakistan appears to demand a
“retrospective” treaty for it feels, otherwise, it would be capped
below India. Though India also faces the same situation vis-a-
vis China, there has not been any strong official statements
other than indications that it would not accept a retrospective
treaty and that the accumulated spent fuel should be treated as
stockpile. To address the problem of inequalities in stockpile
among various states, one of the proposals is that states with
inferior stockpiles could declare a moratorium on production
and join the treaty at an appropriate time when the stockpile
in countries of concern to them decreases to a level equal to
its own, with an additional condition that there will be a
reversal from the moratorium if the disarmament process does
not take place at a desired or committed pace.15 This would to
some extent protect the interests of China, India, Pakistan and
Israel. Moratorium on fissile material production before the
treaty comes into force, without a commitment to time-bound
disarmament by P5, would be risking a slippery slope in light
of the negative experience of the total neglect and indifference
of the P5 to their commitment under Article VI of NPT.
IV. The FMCT and Critical Issues for India
The basic question for India is whether there is any set of
circumstances which could strongly influence the signing of
FMCT. In order to consider this, India’s security objectives in
the short and long term have to be clearly formulated, and the
consequent steps to achieve them identified. It has to be kept
in mind that with the end of the cold war, India’s security in
the foreseeable future will have to be ensured with its own
capabilities to a greater extent than before, with a clear
perception of threat and of the capability to meet them. On
the other hand, economically India’s intertwinement with global
economic forces and players is being deepened at a rapid pace
in a departure from the past; this can be both an opportunity
as well as an obstacle in terms of India’s security policy.
Having exploded nuclear devices and having taken the
necessary steps towards weaponisation, India has to have a
proper means-end analysis between its capability and needs.
Specifically, if China rather than Pakistan is to be viewed as
the primary target of Indian nuclear “deterrence,” then the
pressures on the Indian nuclear weaponisation would be of a
different character and magnitude, with important implications
not only for fissile material decisions but also the attendant
delivery systems. On this key question, there appears to be
very little study being done.16
The technical aspects of FMCT relate to stockpiling; processes
such as reprocessing, enrichment and separation techniques,
plant types and construction; verification; civilian versus
military applications of Pu; and whether the Treaty should
also include stockpile and spent fuel (which will be a very
large source of Pu in the near future [figure-1(a) & (b)], much
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in excess of that released from weapons). The present study
will consider some of these issues while discussing the various
options.
India currently faces no legal constraints on production of
fissile material for weapons, similar to the nuclear weapon
states, and NPT non-signatories Pakistan and Israel. The P5
have already stockpiled enormous quantities of fissile material
both as weapons and those released from weapons consequent
to arms reduction (refer to Table 1 and 2). The U.S. and
Russia hence have excess weapons Pu; and Britain and France
seem to have concluded that there is little security justification
for building up their weapons Pu any further and that their
current stockpile levels are adequate. For India, the problem
is more political than technical. The country has demonstrated
that it has the necessary technical capability in both nuclear
testing and the production of Pu, but the question is whether it
has reached a stage of sufficiency in providing adequate
deterrence with reference to the capabilities of its immediate
neighbours, at least for a time period before the much talked
about total disarmament is achieved. It is also to be emphasised
that a “freeze” at this point of time does not have any effect
on the P5, especially U.S. and Russia, which have large
stockpiles. It is so very evident and not too difficult to conclude
that the target nations of FMCT are India, Pakistan, Israel and
perhaps to some extent China.
FMCT Options for India
Six possible options for India are identified and analysed in
terms of benefits and risks. These six options are:
Option One : Sign as is.
Option Two : Sign but with conditions.
Option Three: Sign with quid-pro-quo.
Option Four : Declare moratorium on fissile material
production.
Option Five : Sign CTBT, declare moratorium on
fissile material  production .
Option Six : Reject FMCT
Overview On Options
Almost every year since 1945, UNGA has been adopting a
variety of resolutions on non-proliferation, disarmament and
other nuclear issues, but with limited impact. This has been
largely so due to lack of seriousness on the part of the P5,
especially U.S., towards disarmament vis-a-vis non-
proliferation. Wherever the interests of the P5 are significant,
they have adopted all means to use UNGA resolutions and
translated them into treaties, as can be seen from the indefinite
extension of NPT and CTBT. Further, in the case of CTBT,
India signing the treaty was made conditional for the treaty to
come into force, which is a classic example of manipulation
and coercion.
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NPT is the corner stone of the commencement of the non-
proliferation regime. By the indefinite extension of the NPT
in 1995, the treaty and hence its contents have acquired a
timeless dimension, legitimizing the two categories of “haves”
and “have nots”. The concept of CTBT and FMCT took birth
along with NPT but was never given the due importance by
the P5 obviously to carry on with the arms race as well as
retain a militarily superior position, by forming cartels and
constituting several denial steps, with the objective of ensuring
the blockade of technology development. After the cold war
and with the changed environment, it became necessary to
institute such steps that will ensure certainty of the non-P5 not
competing in any way with the P5 and maintaining P5
superiority. Obviously, the choice is to revive actively CTBT
and FMCT calling them steps towards disarmament, which is
strictly speaking not so. These are in effect non-proliferation
measures to ensure the superiority of P5s and perpetuate the
denial regime, with no commitment to disarmament. In this
process, the P5 do not seem to accept that the needs of national
security which they themselves claimed as the reason for
developing atomic weapons are of any relevance for others.
In response to the U.S. proposal, the UNGA recommended in
December 1993, by a consensus resolution 48/75L, negotiation
in the most appropriate international forum regarding a non-
discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively
verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for
nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. The
resolution also requested the CD to consider how and where a
ban on the production of fissile materials could be negotiated.
Since CTBT had a higher priority over FMCT, it was only in
1995 that a mandate was agreed upon and an ad hoc committee
was set up. However, there was no significant progress during
the years 1996-98 mainly because of differences over the scope
of the treaty. The two important aspects which stalled the
treaty relate to cut-off time (prospective/retrospective) and
linkage to time-bound disarmament. Pakistan has been
demanding a retrospective cut-off even suggesting that FMCT
should be renamed as “Fissile Material Treaty” (since “Cut-
off” in FMCT implies future production only) . Similarly,
G-21 countries have been demanding formation of a concurrent
ad hoc committee to discuss time-bound disarmament which
could also include Security Assurances, Middle East Peace
Processes etc.
An important feature of the treaty is that fissile materials for
military and peaceful uses and not related to nuclear weapons
are not restricted. Under this would fall fuel for naval reactors,
research and power reactors etc. This separation in scope would
demand the continued use of enrichment and reprocessing
facilities and application of strict safeguards to ensure that the
fissile material produced for non-weapons purposes does not
find its way into weapons use clandestinely.
27 28
S RajagopalFissile Material Cut-off Treaty and Options for India
Non-discriminatory safeguards would naturally mean “full
scope” under FMCT. What the implications of the safeguards
are, for countries who are non-signatories to NPT and weapons
capable, is an issue of great importance needing in depth
analysis, especially in the context of one’s national security
and the slow progress towards global nuclear disarmament.
The issue gets more complicated when a state has to live
within close proximity of a weapon power.
While UNGA resolution (1993) and the subsequent Shannon
Mandate (1995) present a broad canvas to view FMCT
objectives, the specifics (as in CTBT) are yet to be agreed
upon. There has been no movements in CD even to commence
negotiations. In the light of the above, ‘as is’ referred to is
what is generally understood or interpreted of the UNGA/
Shannon statements with regard to Scope and Verification
which are two important elements of FMCT. In this report
under option one, the assumptions are:
l Scope: Prospective
l Verification: Limited i.e. commencing from process like
l  reprocessing, enrichment etc.
Safeguards: By IAEA, non-discriminatory including P5.
The Options that follow will therefore have to be assessed
taking into consideration what has been stated above.
Option One: Sign As Is
Benefits
(i) Possible slackening of technology controls and embargoes.
(ii) Prospects of better Indo-US bilateral relations and co-
operation in the areas relating to security, economic
development, and South Asian stability.
(iii) Possible projection of a better image of India by P-5.
(i) Possible slackening of technology controls and
embargoes
After India conducted a nuclear test at Pokharan in 1974, the
denial of advanced technology by U.S. and Canada became
one of the important components of their foreign policy. The
refusal by the U.S. to provide spare parts to Tarapur Power
Station, followed by a similar refusal on fuel supply, was the
immediate fallout of the explosion. Canada discontinued
nuclear co-operation at all levels. For India, technological
advancement is a key ingredient for developing comprehensive
strength not only to ensure national security but also to provide
its large population with a better quality of life. The tool of
technology denial was adopted by the developed nations to
maintain their dominance in the hierarchical structure of the
international system. India has been at the receiving end of
such measures not only during the cold war but also after. In
the post-cold war period the denial regimes have been
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re-oriented from East-West to North-South frame work. For
more than two decades, India figures prominently on the
technology control radar screens of the advanced nations.
Though the control and embargo regimes that followed the1974
and 1998 tests have been a blessing in disguise, in the sense that
it has given a big push towards indigenisation and selfreliance in
core sectors as is evident from the developments that have taken
place over the past 25 years in the areas relating to atomic energy,
defence and space, there is no denial of the fact that all these
developments are not without a penalty in terms of cost and time
which a developing country like India can ill afford.
With the above as background, one could look at the possibility
of the “need” and “effect” of slackening or at least softening
of export control regimes and embargoes. In some areas, there
has been already a slackening of export controls in response
to the global diffusion and development of indigenous
technologies. One such example is in the area of high
performance computing. U.S. has been compelled to liberalise
its export policy in response to the availability of more powerful
super computers from other suppliers, including India. India
was earlier denied an export license for a U.S. Cray XMP-14
super computer which resulted in India developing its own
parallel processing computers, one such being PARAM. The
history of technology controls which took shape in the form
of a group dominated by industrialised nations suggests that
the spread of advanced technologies is sought to be controlled
or prevented, most likely to thwart the objectives of emerging
powers to achieve and maintain technological superiority. This
appears to be the motivation for the weapon states to pursue
vigorously non-proliferation and disarmament.
In the existing scenario, three developments17 are underway
on the technology control front as part of the new U.S.
strategies and initiatives:
* the regulatory focus of technology controls is changing
ominously from an east-west perspective to a north-south
perspective, with the ex-target states in the east block
being brought into multilateral regimes and encouraged
to set up national export control mechanisms;
* all possible dual-purpose technologies are being subjected
to export controls, with the result that all high technologies
are consciously being kept beyond the reach of the targeted
countries; and
* the principal targets, as acknowledged by western officials,
are now increasingly South Asia (defined as India and
Pakistan) and the Middle East excluding Israel.
As already stated, the “need” for import of necessary and
relevant technologies depends on several factors:
1. To avoid loss of time and the attendant cost, India has the
competence to decide on what is the state-of-the-art in
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critical technologies needed. The absence of such
competence could result in obsolete technologies being
dumped, as happens very often. India has the ability and
capability to build on technologies imported to enable
leap-frogging.
2. In the case of buying equipment, there is always the
alternative of making it, which is mainly dependent on
economic considerations and availability.
3. Borderless exchange of technologies and information
would enable use of pooled expertise and facilities leading
to a healthy co-operative environment and a step towards
confidence building.
The “effect” could be slowing down on the effort of
indigenisation and lesser emphasis on selfreliance. Every crisis
India faced has taught the lesson that there is no substitute for
developing internal capability and strength. Nevertheless, one
cannot deny the fact that there is a technology gap that exists
between the developed and developing countries which needs
to be bridged in the larger interests of achieving international
stability. The slackening of controls would hence be of help,
if there is no unacceptable compromise in any form attached.
* [The main multilateral technology-controls are the Zangger Committee,
the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG) (the “London Club”), the Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the new Wassenaar
Arrangement. For details, refer to Annex-2 (a) & (b)].
(ii) Prospects of better Indo-US bilateral relations and co-
operation in the areas relating to security, economic
development, and South Asian stability.
One other important benefit for India could be a general
improvement in building confidence between India and the
West and forging mutual co-operation in a number of areas
indicated above. Paradoxically, it has not been possible to
maintain a stable and balanced relationship between India and
U.S., despite the countries being the two largest democracies
with shared values. Signing the FMCT by India in the present
form could provide an impetus for the U.S. to make a renewed
search for common ground. From an Indian perspective, senior
officials of the Clinton administration have to be sufficiently
informed and convinced about the national security
compulsions facing India.
The existing global scenario gives reason for both countries to
desire better ties. The study done in 1997 by the New York
based Council on Foreign Relations (consisting of several high
level experts and former policy makers) titled A New U.S.
Policy Toward India and Pakistan suggests that the Clinton
administration should take a fresh look at India in the context
of its engagement with Asia in a strategic sense. The
recommendations given by the Task Force seem to go beyond
earlier American analysis. The main tenets of the study
basically suggest that the U.S. discourage further proliferation,
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and establish a more stable plateau for Indian and Pakistani
nuclear weapon and missile competition. It suggests that the
U.S. should seek closer bilateral political and military co-
operation over the long term, especially with India. A strong
and friendly India could play a key role in helping to maintain
stability and economic growth across Asia.
To explore the possibility for a closer relationship as well as
to provide incentives for Indian restraint in the nuclear weapon
and missile areas, the Task Force recommended that the U.S.
adopt a declaratory policy that acknowledges India’s growing
power and importance; maintain high-level attention including
regular reciprocal visits of senior officials; loosen U.S.
constraints upon the transfer of certain dual-use technologies
(including computers and peaceful space launch equipment);
increase military-to-military co-operation (including broader
contacts, exchanges, and joint exercising); co-operate on
elements of India’s civilian nuclear power programme and
other energy related issues; and undertake limited conventional
arms sales. Though the study was done in 1997 and subsequent
developments both in India and Pakistan have resulted in a
significant change in the U.S. attitude, the recommendations
still appear to be valid and important.
An important segment of U.S. policy toward India and Pakistan
after the tests is reflected in a subsequent study by an
Independent Task Force convened by the Council on Foreign
Relations and the Brookings Institution.18 The report endorses
the 1997 conclusion by reiterating that “India has the potential to
be a major power in Asia as the next century opens,” and
recommends that U.S. foreign policy should reflect this and accord
a higher priority to South Asia. It also recommends a “stronger
push for authority to waive sanctions and a greater public
articulation of the fact that U.S. interests in South Asia include
but are not limited to discouraging nuclear proliferation.”19
The U.S. has provided support and encouragement for the
process of India’s liberalisation, but it can step up its efforts in
this area even further - by sharing relevant technical,
administrative, and financial expertise; by working in
conjunction with other national governments and international
financial institutions; and perhaps even by providing direct
economic incentives (including U.S. assistance and support
for India in international financial institutions) in response to
further progress in liberalisation.
India’s economic reforms have created immense demand for
foreign direct investment in practically all major sectors of
U.S. competitive strength. These include power, oil refining,
food processing, biotechnology, and computer software and
services. In 1994, the Commerce Department of U.S. identified
India as a ‘Big Emerging Market.’ Top U.S. corporations, led
by General Electric along with a handful of other regional
influence, have put together an informal India interest group
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to exert influence, in Congress and improve overall ties. The
most important reason for this transformation is organised
lobbying on India’s behalf by U.S. corporations interested in
doing business in India.
During 1991-95, American MNCs were India’s largest source
for foreign direct investment, which provided 26 percent of
the country’s total investment from outside. The largest share
of U.S. investment, hovering around 50 percent, went to
manufacturing, with the consumer sub-sector accounting for a
little more than half of that total. Other major investments
were made in banking (28 percent), energy (9 percent), and
computers/software (9 percent).20
A renewed debate on the future of liberalisation has now
started after the change of guard at the centre in India. The
ruling Bharatiya Janata Party has indicated that economic
reforms will have to be accompanied by massive programmes
for agriculture and rural development, including employment
generation and food-for-work schemes to alleviate poverty.
The government under Vajpayee has been more receptive to
foreign investors’ concerns than anticipated, a fact not lost on
important sections of American politicians. In February 1999,
Congressman Jim McDermott from the U.S. House of
Representatives, visited India to establish an inter-
parliamentarian committee consisting of selected Lok Sabha
members and U.S. Congressional members. According to
Representative McDermott, the nuclear tests and the divergence
between India and U.S. should not be allowed to stand in the
way of developing further business interests, as the new
committee’s intent is to cultivate personal relations at this
important level so as to smooth the road ahead. He pointed
out that the U.S. maintains such contact with Japanese Diet
members.21
If India signs FMCT in the present form, there is a possibility
that it would contribute toward a more stable and predictable
situation in South Asia. For this, American military aid and
arms supplies to Pakistan would have to be curtailed. Until
now, Pakistan has been a strategic ally of the U.S., and it was
successful in making powerful friends in the Pentagon and
State Department. The situation may change and an “Indian
Interest Group” may gain leverage at the decision making
levels. The structural changes in the second Clinton
administration are a pointer to U.S. interest in upgrading India
in the area of foreign policy. It was generally believed that
India could not have a more favourable team than the Albright-
Pickering-Inderfurth combination which is shaping U.S. foreign
policy towards India today. The other point of cordial ties can
be seen in the context of the support within the American
Congress in comparison to Pakistan. The India caucus currently
has about 90 members compared with eight in 1993. Thus,
there are some clear signals which prove that this may be the
right time for India to exploit its full potential. While the
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atmospherics for closer India-U.S. interaction exist, the recent
sanctions that followed the tests have been a serious stumbling
block resulting in misunderstandings and damage. Both
countries need to discover innovative means to circumvent
this block, which may call for a certain amount of diplomatic
“finessing.”
In the Indo-Pak-U.S. triangular equation, it should be noted
that Pakistan was twice denied assistance under legislation
designed to prevent aid to countries engaged in manufacturing
nuclear weapons - the first time, in 1979, under the Symington
amendment. Within months, the American Congress waived
the Symington amendment as it related to Pakistan, and
approved a major military assistance package of high-tech
military equipment, in return for Islamabad’s pledge to act as
undeclared conduit for U.S. aid to Afghan guerrillas fighting
the Soviet invasion. In 1990, with the end of the Afghanistan
war, Congress invoked the Pressler amendment to ban all
economic and military assistance to Pakistan, once President
Bush failed to certify that Pakistan was not in possession of
nuclear weapons. The Hank Brown amendment was passed in
1995 despite Congressional opposition and has paved the way
for the transfer of military equipment worth $ 658 million,
including sophisticated maritime aircraft and missiles.
However, this transfer has remained in limbo so far. Overall,
there is no denying that Indo-U.S. relations are greatly strained
at the moment. It is hoped that the fast paced, “protected”
meetings between Strobe Talbott and Jaswant Singh could be
the beginning of a real dialogue between the two countries
which would lead to strategic understanding, if not consensus.
It should be noted that this is the first time in post-independence
history that such a high level and sustained dialogue has taken
place. Signing FMCT clearly could be one step towards
solidifying this effort.
(iii) Possible projection of a better image of India by P-5
If India signs FMCT as is, even after the tests, it is likely to
regain leadership among the Non-Nuclear Weapon States
(NNWS) and then can more confidently moot the idea of
complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a definite
time framework. It is important to recognise that despite being
signatories to the NPT and CTB, the NNWS demand for time-
bound global nuclear disarmament, which India has been
propagating for more than two decades, has received very
little support from the weapon powers.
India will be also softening its stand and giving a signal to the
world that it wants to be less isolated than it has been since
1996. Since India did not sign the CTBT, many nations branded
India to be the “spoiler” of the Treaty. This image of “spoiler”
should disappear after signing the FMCT. India’s relations
with the neighbouring countries will also improve and the
prospects for regional co-operation could also increase.
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Risks
(i) Internationally, signing of FMCT by India can be viewed
as succumbing to pressure by the P5 and may be also
viewed as a shift from its earlier position. India has been
advocating global nuclear disarmament since it achieved
independence. If it signs FMCT, it would be seen that it
gave in under pressure and surrendered its objective of
moving towards committed time-bound disarmament.
India may not be able to accomplish the task of pursuing
its position on nuclear issues as adamantly as before. The
weakening of its position on the question of abolition of
nuclear weapons within a definite time framework will
convey a negative signal and may be called as non-
committal on the whole range of issues. India’s continued
commitment that it will not come under pressure on all
these issues would be taken lightly. It may also lose its
credibility, and the developing nations may not rely on
India’s proclamations in the future.
(ii) Internally, it will be viewed as inconsistency in India’s
policy of linkage to time-bound global disarmament.
Domestic political debates will likely get highly
acrimonious.
(iii) India may be seen as a “soft” nation after signing FMCT
putting its sovereignty somewhat at stake.
(iv) FMCT will prohibit future production of fissile material
for weapon purposes. This could compromise national
security interests. It is pertinent to note that the nuclear
weapon states have excess fissile material stockpiles, and
a freeze on production would not affect them in any way.
(v) The Treaty, as stated in the UNGA consensus resolution
(48/75L) reads, “would be a significant contribution to
non-proliferation in all its aspects.” There is hence an
admission that at best, it may pay lip service to
disarmament. The objective of total disarmament and a
nuclear weapon free world may become a dream if FMCT
is signed and no serious effort is put in the direction of
disarmament as it has been the case till now.
(vi) The nature and extent of verification arrangements are
not clearly defined, though it is understood that IAEA
would be entrusted with this task. The extent of safeguards
which will be the verification measure could be either
minimum, applicable only to enrichment and reprocessing
plants, or maximum which could include all facilities like
power reactors, fuel fabrication etc. The maximum regime
which is nothing but full scope safeguards is a strategy to
corner India, which operates only facility specific
safeguards (INFCIRC/66).
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Maximise benefits
Though the step proposed below will not maximise benefits,
it will, at the least, ensure that the commitments made are not
forgotten once the Treaty is signed. The step is a linkage to
dismantlement of controls and embargoes.
Minimise risks
(i) Since several years are expected to pass before the
ratification of the Treaty would come up, there should be
concerted efforts at building up stockpile in the interim
period.
(ii) Linkage to time-bound disarmament would ensure that
the P5 take disarmament seriously.
(iii) India could insist on a minimum verification regime which
would adequately safeguard the Treaty interests at an
affordable cost.
Option Two: Sign Conditional FMCT
India should put forth the following conditions before signing
FMCT:
(a) Cut-off only prospective
(b) Time-bound global nuclear disarmament
(c) Limited Scope
(d) Discharged spent fuel to be treated as stockpile
(e) Tritium to be included
(f) Use for military purposes to be banned
(g) Non-discriminatory verification and safeguards regime
(a) Cut-off only prospective
The key problems associated with the Treaty in CD from the
outset include the following:
1. Whether stockpiles of Pu and HEU should be included as
demanded by Egypt, Pakistan and some other NAM
countries, or only the future production should be
addressed as defined by the P5, Israel and India. As long
as there is no serious effort at disarmament, and it is
claimed even in the UNGA resolution 48/75L that FMCT
is a non-proliferation measure, India should stipulate that
the Treaty should be prospective in nature. The declared
Indian doctrine of ‘Credible Minimum Deterrence’ would
demand such a step as a minimum requirement. The
stalemate at CD is best described in the following
statement. “The mandate agreed upon in March 1995
fudged the issue, the result of clever drafting by Gerald
Shannon, the Canadian Special Co-ordinator, at a time
when certain states wished to report progress to the NPT
conference (1995 Review Conference) but no real
compromise could be agreed upon.”22 The progress beyond
1995 and to the present period may be summed up as
insignificant.
The U.S. position on this is revealed in a statement made
at CD in January 1999 that “Cut-off itself can not be a
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vehicle for addressing existing stocks. The U.S. position
is well known - it will not agree to any restrictions on
existing stocks in a cut-off treaty.”23
2. Linkage to time-bound nuclear disarmament which was
demanded by G-21 countries, along with the establishment
of a concurrent ad hoc committee on total nuclear
disarmament to consider it.
Although three years have passed after negotiations commenced
in CD, there has been very little progress other than India,
Pakistan and Israel agreeing to participate in the negotiations.
At the CD which reconvened on 18 January 1999, there were
several statements and three distinct proposals on nuclear
disarmament. South Africa resubmitted its 1998 proposal for
an ad hoc committee to “deliberate upon practical steps for
systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons
as well as to identity, if and when one or more such steps
should be the subject of negotiations in the conference.”24
Unfortunately, this submission did not achieve a consensus.
Egypt subsequently proposed an ad hoc committee on nuclear
disarmament to commence negotiations on a phased
programme of nuclear disarmament with the objective of
complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Belgium on behalf
of the five NATO countries (Belgium, Italy, Germany,
Netherlands and Norway) proposed an Ad hoc Working Group
to study ways and means of establishing exchange of
information and views within the conference on endeavours
towards nuclear disarmament.
The lack of support for disarmament stems out of the attitude
of the P5, especially U.S. This is revealed in the recent
statement made by John Holum, Acting Under Secretary of
State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs at
CD, Geneva on 21 January 1999, when he identified two key
elements of fissban to be “scope and verification,” but did not
make any reference to disarmament.
Prospective cut-off may not be a genuine step towards
disarmament since the weapon powers except perhaps China
have abundant stockpile of fissile material. The related arms
control process is extremely slow with START II indefinitely
delayed by the Russian Duma for ratification. An added
problem is NATO expansion which occurred in March 1999.
In addition, Clinton has abandoned his threat to veto the missile
defence bill which is being pushed by Republicans in the U.S.
Congress. This will undoubtedly create tensions with Russia
regarding the Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and other
arms control agreements.25 All these factors cast serious doubts
on the irreversibility of the arms race. Given these conditions,
the objective of western powers appears to be to target and
cap India, Pakistan and Israel, and to some extent China
as well.
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In the present context of India declaring herself as a nuclear-
weapon State, and the adamant attitude of P5 refusing any
linkage of disarmament to FMCT, prospective cut-off would
best serve India’s objective of maintaining credible minimum
deterrence with “no first use.” This Indian position would also
help in ensuring that negotiations in CD on FMCT are not
deadlocked. The Indian support to prospective cut-off could
appear to be a shift from its demand for moving towards a
Nuclear Weapon Free World (NWFW). A deeper analysis
would indicate it is not so. Prospective cut-off will, as a first
step, freeze the arsenals at the existing level. International
accounting and control over stockpile would prevent
clandestine diversion and also ensure non-reversibility. When
these are coupled to time-bound disarmament through the
START process, it may be seen that a NWFW is a feasible
proposition. Strict verification and control in the prospective
cut-off regime would effectively address prospective
proliferation concerns. This being so, there should be no
technology controls once FMCT comes into force. Realistically,
an issue of such huge magnitude can be tackled only by a
step-by-step process, and not possibly by a single stroke. This
is subject to, of course, the assumption that the P5 would
adhere to their commitment towards disarmament and would
not repeat an act similar to the violation of Article VI of NPT.
Benefits
(i) If the Treaty is prospective, it would restrict the availability
of fissile material for weapons.
(ii) India would be capped above Pakistan.
(iii) India would be in a position to retain stockpile fissile
material, however small, which will ensure conditions of
minimum deterrence policy are met to an extent.
Risks
(i) India would be capped lower than China.
(ii) Discrimination with regard to the stockpiles would
continue among the nations.
(iii) If FMCT is prospective in nature, it cannot be seen as a
satisfactory objective to aim for a real disarmament
measure though it can be argued that it is a step towards
progressive disarmament.
(b) Time-bound global nuclear disarmament
As already stated, linkage to time-bound disarmament by
G-21 countries has been turned down by weapon states with
the U.S. taking the lead. The U.S. considers that weapons
stockpiles are addressed under START separately, and the deep
reductions planned as part of START would be a disarmament
measure. While addressing stockpiles and reductions, it is
essential to ensure that a non-discriminatory, internationally
administered safeguard regime is put in place after declaration
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and verification. The physical protection will have to be under
international control to ensure non-reuse. With the above
measures in position and limiting the availability of fissile
material, FMCT (prospective) would result in placing greater
constraints on weapon states in furthering the growth of their
arsenals. The assumption here is that no work would be done
towards developing newer weapons. India, during CTBT
negotiations, had linked it to time-bound disarmament, and
consequently had to refuse signing the Treaty. If this position
is going to be compromised due to any reason under CTBT,
and the disarmament process does not progress satisfactorily,
it would be necessary to link time-bound disarmament to
FMCT. There has been a constant demand for the establishment
of an ad hoc working group on nuclear disarmament. In the
recent CD, Belgium, on behalf of five NATO countries, while
stressing that FMCT carries a high priority had expressed the
view that disarmament and arms reduction were major issues
for the international community and a working group would
be a useful step.26 With G-21 and South Africa receiving
support from the proposal of the five NATO countries on the
setting up of a working group on nuclear disarmament, it is
clear that the nuclear disarmament issue cannot be kept out of
the CD forever and it appears the negotiations on FMCT can
progress only if a decision on setting up of an ad hoc
committee/working group is taken at the earliest.
Benefits
(i) Indian image would get a boost for steadfastly adhering to the
demand for time-bound disarmament. The support for
disarmament has been growing in the CD as is evident from the
proposals of South Africa, five NATO countries and NAM.
(ii) It will put pressure on the P5 to disarm at a faster pace
and push ahead with START.
Risks
(i) India can come under pressure as it happened in the case
of CTBT. The Treaty can take the same route as CTBT
though such a possibility is less due to support for
disarmament in CD from various groups.
(ii) FMCT could become a treaty of broken bargain wherein
the P5 could agree for a time-bound disarmament but not
keep their part of the commitment, similar to experience
with Article (VI) of NPT.
Maximise benefits
Support actively G-21 and other proposals of South Africa,
five NATO Countries for time-bound disarmament.
Minimise risks
Avoid last minute changes but evolve a clear strategy right
from the start of negotiations. It is recognised that dynamics
of negotiation can force new directions but solutions to various
postulations must be worked out in advance.
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(c) Limited Scope
Non-discriminatory safeguards will be one of the important
requirements of the FMCT regime. Obviously, this will relate
to processes that lead to the production of fissile materials.
There has been a debate as to the moment at which the
safeguards should apply in the nuclear fuel cycle chain. With
regard to facilities, safeguards can either be focused or broad-
based. The former would restrict the safeguards to reprocessing
and enrichment plants while the later would include reactors,
fuel fabrication facilities etc. Since what is to be safeguarded
and controlled are the fissile materials, there would be no
useful purpose served in including the reactors etc. unless
clandestine diversion of spent fuel and clandestine downstream
processing facilities are postulated which is far-fetched. It is
necessary to use such a “language” in the Treaty which will
not limit safeguards to just reprocessing and enrichment plants,
but also include laser separation facilities or any future
developments that could lead to fissile material production for
weapons purpose. The safeguards regime under FMCT would
be quite complicated, exhaustive and costly due to :
1. Reprocessing/Enrichment facilities operate in several
countries [figure-2 (a) & (b)] and are spread out.
2. Fissile material for peaceful uses like power generation
would still be permitted.
3. Fissile material for naval propulsion and research reactors
would also be permitted.
Perhaps it would be possible to bring under international control
all fissile material production units but this can only be a
long-term measure after establishing sufficient confidence that
the world is moving towards a non-reversible disarmament
regime. India has facility safeguards (INFCIRC/66) and hence
becoming a party to FMCT would attract an enhanced
verification system, if the same is broad- based.
Benefits
This would ensure that inspection and verification would be
restricted to reprocessing and enrichment facilities, thus
providing certain freedom and flexibility in the operation of
reactors and other facilities. In effect, this will prevent the
back door entry of full scope safeguards.
Risks
Restricting inspection and verification to reprocessing and
enrichment plants only will leave out other process like laser
separation etc. which needs to be addressed.
Maximise benefits
India has declared herself as a weapon state. Hence certain
facilities can be declared as for military purposes which will
lead to these being treated similar to those of P5.
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Minimise risks
The Treaty language should be such that it not only addresses
reprocessing and enrichment facilities but also any further
developments that could lead to fissile material production for
weapons (example: Laser).
(d) Discharged Spent Fuel to be treated as stockpile
Spent fuel is the source for plutonium both for power generation
and possible weapons use. The necessity for India to reprocess
spent fuel discharged from its first phase power programme
needs no explanation, considering the fact that the Pu so
produced is an essential input for the second phase (fast
breeder) and the third phase (thorium utilisation) power
programmes. All this would be permitted under FMCT regime.
There is a great concern that the Pu from civilian programmes
will greatly exceed weapons Pu by the year 2010 [figure-1
(a)]. Due to proliferation possibility, the U.S. prefers “once
through” cycle i.e. not to recycle but to store spent fuel without
reprocessing. Recently, due to pressure from a section of
scientists arguing for converting weapons Pu to MOX fuel for
use in operating power reactors, there has been an interim
decision to convert part of the weapon stockpile into MOX
fuel and immobilise the remaining Pu as waste after mixing
with high level wastes. If predictions hold true, there would
be a revival of nuclear power from its present slow down in
western countries, and reprocessing of spent fuel will be a
continuing activity. U.K. and France presently operate plants
for commercial reprocessing purposes. While it is prudent to
be cautious, it is neither scientific nor sensible to treat Pu as a
waste with so much of hidden energy which can be exploited
for power generation. An effective safeguards system in
position should be able to address the proliferation concerns
adequately. Another debatable point on the use of Pu for power
production is economics. At today’s cost of natural uranium
and availability, many consider recycling Pu to be
uneconomical. This does not, however, apply to India which
has been denied access to global natural uranium. Moreover,
there is a need for India to exploit its abundant thorium
resources for power production especially when its oil and gas
reserves are poor.
India has declared herself as a weapon-state, thereby implying
weaponisation. To have an effective minimum deterrence in
place, stockpiling Pu is essential. India is presently constrained
by limited reprocessing capacity. There is a need to augment
this capacity quickly to hold enough Pu stockpile though this
can reach no where near the weapon states stockpile. India had
been successful in not classifying spent fuel as waste under the
Nuclear Waste Convention, foiling an attempt of the P5. This
position should not be changed until there is evidence of true
disarmament and global access for India to sources of natural
uranium is made possible without unacceptable conditions.
53 54
S RajagopalFissile Material Cut-off Treaty and Options for India
Benefits
India has a large stock of weapons usable reactor produced
fissile material. Spent fuel being classified as stockpile would
result in its coming out of accounting under the Treaty and
add to the stockpile which is not addressed by the Treaty.
Maximise benefits
Accelerate the reprocessing and enrichment activities and
improve performance.
Minimise risks
The risk is minimum since accumulation of spent fuel in China
and Pakistan is not significant (Refer to Table-3).
(e) Tritium to be included
Tritium is used in the nuclear weapons as a booster in the
fission devices and also in the thermo-nuclear devices. Tritium
has a half life of 12.3 years which necessitates replenishment
in nuclear weapons at periodic intervals. Though a nuclear
weapon can function without tritium, its inclusion in the Treaty
would result in lesser confidence and lead to obsolescence of
existing arsenals.27 Banning tritium production for weapons
purposes will send the right signal of moving towards
disarmament. The arms reduction process that is in progress
is bound to result in release of tritium, which can be recycled
if at all found necessary, as it has happened with Pu though
not on the same scale. The released tritium could be adequate
to support the existing stockpile without any new plants being
brought in. It is also to be noted that the tritium producing
reactors also produce Pu. The U.S. government’s recent
proposal to use Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) reactors is
definitely a step in the wrong direction at a time when FMCT
is hotly pursued at the CD. It is also a serious deviation from
the U.S. policy of not using civilian reactors for military
purposes. Some eminent U.S. scientists believe that fresh
tritium production can be post-poned by several decades if the
START process is implemented seriously which will ultimately
result in near nuclear weapon states holding weapons in
hundreds before total elimination.28
Benefits
Will render P5 stockpile weapons less reliable in terms of
performance and lead to obsolescence.
Risks
India will also be facing the problem of sustaining the weapons
which need regular replenishment of tritium.
Minimise risks
The number of weapons held by India being definitely limited,
a strategy should be evolved to ensure that a tritium ban does
not adversely affect the Indian stockpile. Alternatively, it can
be argued that the tritium ban would apply only from the time
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the States join FMCT, the timing being decided depending on
the stockpile of the state concerned vis-a-vis the P5.
(f) Use of stockpile for Military purposes to be banned
While the FMCT regime would prohibit production of fissile
material for weapons purposes, it would permit use of fissile
material for military purposes like for example in nuclear
submarines. While there is sense in permitting use of Pu for
peaceful purposes like power production, it is necessary to
prohibit any military use if the Treaty is to be more
comprehensive in nature. HEU is also used in research reactors
but this problem is being resolved by converting the reactors
for use of LEU as fuel. A similar change is possible also in
the case of nuclear submarines.
Benefits
It will simplify safeguards activity since no HEU will be
permitted for use in submarines, and this to certain extent
may ensure balance between P5 capability and others.
Risks
This could impact India which is on its route to building
nuclear submarines.
Maximise benefits
India should push for a Indian Ocean regime which will
effectively keep out or limit outside powers in the Indian
Ocean.
Minimise risks
India needs state-of-the-art Technology R&D in submarine
building and alternative technologies.
(g) Non-discriminatory verification and safeguards regime
Verification is an important element of FMCT. By definition,
“it is a process in which data are collected, collated and
analysed to make an informed judgement as to whether a
party is complying with the committed obligations”29 whereas
the primary objective of the safeguards (under NPT) is to take
such measures as necessary to ensure that no clandestine
diversion of declared nuclear material of concern takes place.
The verification function under FMCT is most likely to be
carried out by IAEA who have been implementing the NPT
safeguards. The verification regime under FMCT would fall
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While the stockpile verification still remains unresolved, there
appears to be some consensus of what is to be done in the
case of future production namely that the verification regime
should be non-discriminatory among all participating states.
In 1993 after the Iraq problems, IAEA initiated actions towards
strengthening safeguards to enhance the ability to detect any
undeclared nuclear activity by increased access to sites and
information. The direct efforts were also towards utilising the
technological developments that had taken place over a period
of time. These include environmental monitoring, greater
access to sites by resorting to no notice inspections and possible
use of commercial satellite imagery.
The methods and technologies used in verifying compliance to
CTBT are much more complicated and involved, whereas in
the case of FMCT, it could be the presently operated safeguard
(Annex-3) mechanism with additions and up-gradation to
strengthen safeguards (INFCIRC/540). The strengthened
safeguards would result in more intrusive inspection.
It is expected that the technical details of the verification
regime would be discussed by a Group of Scientific Experts
(GSE) similar to the procedure followed in the case of CTBT.
It has to be ensured that the techniques designed to provide
effective verification will be protecting sensitive installations
and information of proprietary in nature.
FMCT would allow use of fissile material for peaceful purposes
like power generation. It has to be ensured that the verification
regime would not result in cumbersome procedures leading to
delay and irritation. The potential diversion scenarios will
have to be examined in great detail and techniques tailor-
made to ensure that such diversions are not possible.
Since asymmetric capabilites in understanding and absorbing
technologies relating to verification exist, there has to be
transparency and an organised effort at training member states
in interpretation and analysis of raw data such as imageries
etc.30 Similarly, as a confidence building measure U.N. satellite
networks providing imageries could be put in place instead of
relying on informations from NTM only.
American attitude with respect to verification is revealed in a
recent statement made by John Holum at the CD. While in the
case of stockpile of P5 the safeguards would be voluntary, it
will continue to be full scope in the case of non-nuclear weapon
states and “the FMCT will comprise its own unique set of
obligations involving some states that have unsafeguarded
fissile material and may very well have such material on
hand.”31  If the Treaty is prospective, a discriminatory
safeguards regime for the stockpile may not pose any problem
and would be of benefit to India as well since it can continue
with the present facility safeguards arrangement (INFIRC/66).
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It has to be anyhow ensured that for the prospective production
of fissile material, the safeguard regime is non-discriminatory.
Benefits
It is clear that the Treaty can only be prospective, as revealed
in the statement of John Holum at CD in January 1999. It is
then obvious that stockpile verification and control will have
to be different from future production in the sense that non-
discriminatory safeguards can apply in the later case. Since
India has declared herself as a nuclear weapon state the
verification regime for stockpile will have to be the same as
that for the P5.
Risks
For verification and control of future production a non-
discriminatory regime could lead to imposition of full scope
safeguards which India has not accepted so far.
Maximise benefits
Having weaponised, it would impact India as much as P5. Of
course, one thing India might have to negotiate on is to be
“accepted as a weapon-state, at least for these purposes.”
Minimise risks
In Treaty language, consider ways to reduce the type of
inspections such as “challenge” and other unannounced
inspections. India should try to be on whatever authority which
is set up to oversee the decision for inspections which would
give India some say in the decisions and ensure Indian interests
are protected.
Option Three: Sign FMCT with Quid Pro Quo
This option is based on the assumption that India is not going
to give up its future production of fissile material for weapon
purposes without gaining something concrete in return. There
were a variety of quid pro quo proposals that India could have
made relating to both technical and political matters. However,
after India tested its nuclear devices in May 1998, it is uncertain
whether quid pro quo would work at the moment. Nonetheless,
the damage control exercise which India undertook after the
tests has certainly helped India in engaging United States in
meaningful discussions on issues on which both the countries
have converging interests and can work together. India has
already explained to the international community in general
and the U.S. in particular about the rationale behind conducting
the nuclear tests.
The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and the Brookings
Institution in their recent report entitled “After the tests: U.S.
Policy towards India and Pakistan” envisage and call for
intensified diplomacy to nudge the two sides toward bilateral
understandings and acceptance of international arms control
protocols. The report also urges an easing of controls on dual
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use technology exports and promoting conventional arms sales
on a case-by-case basis. It is generally argued that the U.S.
resumption of economic assistance, military aid and defence
co-operation should not hinge on non-proliferation milestones.
This is a clear indication of the opinion of the experts.
The eight rounds of talks between the U.S. and India (Strobe
Talbott - Jaswant Singh ) held until now after the May 1998
nuclear tests have in stark reality produced nothing tangible
excepting perhaps a softer approach on sanctions, which could
be more to ensure that the commercial interests of U.S.
companies are not hurt. Both the countries are trying their
best to protect their positions. Nevertheless, these talks in a
way reveal that the bargaining route is not shut with the United
States while dealing with nuclear issues and national and
international security, subject to the condition that India is
able to convincingly argue its cause.
Since the end of the cold war, the main objective of the arms
control policies appear to be to prevent the development of
military capabilities by non-western societies that could
threaten Western commercial interests. The West has attempted
to do this through international agreements, economic pressures
and controls on the transfer of arms and weapons technologies.
While the NPT, CTBT, FMCT, MTCR and Wassenaar
Arrangement establish non-proliferation and technology control
regimes, international financial institutions like the World Bank
and the IMF exert economic pressures.
Viewed in this context, India can make some quid pro quo
proposals with the U.S. though U.S. has been saying that
India should sign the NPT and CTBT without any conditions.
(a) Dismantle sanctions and Embargo regimes.
(b) S&T Information Exchange.
(a) Dismantle Sanctions and Embargo Regimes
First and foremost, the economic sanctions applied by the
U.S. should be withdrawn completely and not in a limited
way as is being done. This certainly should not be seen as a
concession but something which follows logically from India’s
willingness to co-operate in non-proliferation measures and
its impeccable record of self imposed compliance.
India certainly needs to develop the critical technologies. The
essential requirements for the development of these
technologies comprise the need to have a sound scientific
base, necessary technical knowledge and skills, infrastructure
and facilities, certain material inputs (raw materials,
components, devices etc.) and adequate funding. These
requirements are rather difficult to meet for a developing
country, especially when there are many other competing
demands. Hence to accelerate the pace of development in
63 64
S RajagopalFissile Material Cut-off Treaty and Options for India
general and promote economic strength in particular, it is
essential that India has free access to state-of-the-art
technologies, the advantage being saving in cost and time. As
a recipient, it is necessary that expertise available within the
country is adequate to judge the viability of the transferred
technologies in terms of not only absorbing and putting to use
but improving on them. Fortunately, having gone through the
difficult phase of development under various Embargo &
Control Regimes [Annex-2(a)], India is in a position to
selectively choose what is needed rather than accept dumped
redundant technologies, as it normally happens when a
developing country seeks help from a developed country. The
fall out of the “no embargoes and controls” could be free flow
of technology and capital in all areas including Space, Defence
and Atomic Energy.
(b) S&T Information Exchange
India’s falling in line with the non-proliferation objectives of
the United States and its western allies should encourage U.S.
to exchange with India necessary information (data and computer
codes) for keeping its technologies updated. It should be recalled
that the former U.S. Defence Secretary, William Perry had made
this offer to China during his visit to Beijing in October 1994.
There is no reason why this cannot be extended to India,
especially when U.S. now recognizes the genuineness of India’s
concern and the rationale behind its recent tests.
Benefits of Conditions (a) and (b)
(i) Although embargoes and controls have strengthened self-
reliance and by that process boosted India’s capabilities in the
areas of defence, space and atomic energy, it has to be
stressed that this has been achieved with an avoidable cost
and time. With the growing needs of the increasing population,
and the increasing economic penalty in terms of cost and
time, moving on to a regime of “No Embargoes & Controls”
is bound to accelerate the pace of attaining economic strength,
strengthen all areas of Indo-U.S. co-operation and move India
to a comparable position vis-a-vis China.
(ii) The sharing of information between the P5 and India
would certainly help in reviving the relationship in a
positive way. The strategic and nuclear co-operation would
introduce certain transparency resulting in enhanced
confidence building.
Risks of Conditions (a) and (b)
(i) The risk which India may face would possibly be a set
back on selfreliance. There could be technological
dependency and the development of indigenous
technologies could be hampered.
(ii) Assuming Pakistan will receive similar treatment, it would
be able to obtain sensitive nuclear technologies. The
implications for India could then be negative.
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Maximise benefits and minimise risks of conditions
(a) and (b)
India should develop a clear cut strategy for continuing with
the indigenous development in the high-tech areas as a fall
back position and not slow down or give up its declared policy
of selfreliance and indigenisation.
Option Four: Declare Moratorium on Fissile Material
Production
India has made it clear that it would not sign NPT though
confusing statements are being made in the case of signing
CTBT after declaring a moratorium. There have been
declarations from scientists both from the Department of
Atomic Energy and Defence Research and Development
Organisation that the present tests have provided the capability
to meet minimum deterrence demands. The Government of
India has also made a categorical declaration of “No First
Use.” While an influential section is for signing CTBT after
the tests, there is also a vociferous group against signing CTBT
for the following reasons:
1. The disarmament process is not proceeding satisfactorily.
START II has not been ratified yet by Duma.
2. Statements by U.S. and Russia indicate that Nuclear
Deterrence is still an active component of their security
strategy and policy.
3. Some in India consider that the CTBT is discriminatory
in nature viewed from the point of view of the veto
power enjoyed by the P5 (one of them could become a
violator) and the superior technology status of U.S. and
Russia, especially U.S., in putting to use National
Technical Means (NTM) which is one of the important
components of CTBT.
4. U.S. is pursuing actively research in many areas which
have dual use, in terms of developing newer and more
powerful weapons, for example conducting sub-critical
and laser induced direct fusion experiments.
5. Treaty “coming into force” is conditional to signing and
ratification by 44 countries which includes India.
Benefits
(i) Moratorium on Fissile Material Production (FMP) would
go at least half way in meeting the requirements of the P5
and at the same time provide an opportunity in a more
moderate fashion for India to press for progress towards
disarmament. India could watch carefully any
developments relating to newer and more powerful nuclear
weapons and initiate promptly necessary steps to mitigate
the fall out of such actions. Pakistan has been shifting its
position on signing CTBT. A moratorium on FMP by
India would also pressure Pakistan to follow at a minimum.
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(ii) Moratorium gives flexibility in the sense that withdrawal
is a simple procedure versus withdrawal after formally
signing the Treaty.
(iii) U.S. could view the moratorium as a significant concession
befitting a reciprocal gesture which could result in breaking
the current Indo-U.S. impasse. Moratorium would be
seen as a middle position both by U.S. and G-21.
(iv) Moratorium would result in India being capped above
Pakistan under the assumption that Pakistan would also
follow suit. Anyhow, considering China-Pak axis, this
may not be a significant benefit.
Risks
(i) Limits the stockpile and caps India inferior to China. The
opportunity to produce fissile material during the
intervening period between declaring a moratorium and
actual signing of the Treaty, which could take several
years, would be lost, which will have a very serious
impact considering the points 1 to 5 of option four.
(ii) Moratorium on CTBT without signature could result only
in a symbolic gain signaling tough Indian posture, but in
real terms there would be no gain since the sanctions
could remain.
(iii) India may be seen as a soft state which can cancel the
credibility gains from the nuclear tests.
Maximise benefits
(i) Allowing G-21 to take the lead on disarmament issues
and similarly the P5 to take the lead on prospective
Treaty without India directly getting involved would be a
good strategy.
(ii) Declaring a moratorium on Fissile Material Production
(FMP) should be postponed till negotiations are complete
and final decision is imminent since this would provide
enough time to increase the stockpile.
Minimise risks
(i) The reprocessing as well as enrichment plants should be
run at optimal efficiency. There should be a crash
programme to build new reprocessing plants and
commission them to increase reprocessing capacity.
(ii) The present moratorium on CTBT can be converted to
signature which could result in lifting of sanctions.
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Option Five : Sign CTBT, Declare Moratorium on Fissile
Material Production
This option figures prominently in the U.S. agenda and is one
of the subjects discussed during the Jaswant Singh-Strobe
Talbott meetings. Moratorium on fissile material production
even before the precise scope of the Treaty is known, is a step
India should not take at all. The intention in such a step is
clearly to cap India at the lowest possible inventory of fissile
materials. It is also to be kept in mind that huge amounts of
money are being spent on so called Science-based Stewardship
Programme under the pretext of ensuring safety, security and
reliability of the weapon stockpile. Both U.S. and Russia are
conducting Sub-critical Experiments (SCE) claiming that they
are out of the scope of CTBT.
Benefits
(i) Signing CTBT could result in an improved environment
and provide a jump start to Indo-U.S. talks. Further, it
would put the burden on U.S. to come up with some
overture. Psychologically, pressure would be off India
and shift to U.S.
(ii) It could provide Clinton administration some better
bargaining position with U.S. Congress to take a softer
attitude. Congressmen seem to ask as to what India has
conceded since the tests to qualify for concessions.
(iii) India signing CTBT could push U.S. to ratify the Treaty.
(iv) It will send a stronger signal to G-21 that India is serious
regarding minimum deterrence though this could result in
a qualitative cap of weapons development in some form.
The move would also signal that India is willing to go
along with international sentiment. Additionally, this step
would lead to greater transparency leaving no ambiguity
regarding India’s real intentions.
(v) An internal benefit is that signing the Treaty gets rid of
the possible politically motivated debates which can
otherwise debilitate Indian policy making. Oddly enough,
if CTBT is left only as a moratorium, there is a risk that it
will be exploited as a political game with constant source
of friction between the party in power and others i.e.
“CTBT to sign or not” can become a political ping-pong
game.
(vi) The biggest advantage of a moratorium on FMP could be
lifting of sanctions.
(vii) It would force Pakistan to follow suit, and may put
pressure on U.S. to persuade/pressurise China to do
likewise.
(viii) Moratorium can always be reversed if there is no
significant progress towards disarmament.
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Risks
(i) The greatest risk is a possible qualitative and quantitative
cap on weapons development assuming the disarmament
process is not taken seriously by the P5 or the process is
slow. The extent of impact can be best judged by the
Department of Atomic Energy and Defence Research and
Development Organisation.
(ii) Internally, the Government could run the risk of losing
out, if convincing arguments are not made for signing
CTBT.
Maximise benefits
The moratorium on FMP should not be linked to signing CTBT.
This would provide additional time in which the stockpile
could be augmented.
Minimise risks
Conducting SCE would send a signal that India has the
capability and signing the Treaty will not result in a qualitative
cap. This will also discourage U.S. from conducting any more
tests, specially in the context of many U.S. scientists declaring
that such tests, even if not a violation of CTBT, are morally
wrong.
Option Six: Reject FMCT
This option is based on the premise that:
1. India will continue to hold on to the moratorium or may
even sign the CTBT.
2. India need not have to conduct further tests including
fusion devices.
3. The present stockpile may not be adequate or does not
have enough margin to meet the immediate needs of
minimum deterrence.
4. The disarmament process is shaky and irreversibility
appears uncertain at this point of time.
5. The corner stone of the non-proliferation objective is the
NPT. It is a bargain struck between ‘haves’ and ‘have-
nots’ on the possession of nuclear weapons in which
NNWS adhered to their commitment but NWS paid lip
service, indulged in arms race [figure-3 (a) & (b)] and
took the world to the brink of near catastrophe. NPT
should be seen in the light of the P5 commitment under
Article VI and its blatant violation by them.
The next important Treaty is the CTBT. Even before the Treaty
comes into force, signs of violations are apparent, like justifying
SCEs, spending huge amounts of money on fusion ignition
experiments and planning for fairly large tritium production
facilities. There is no guarantee that the P5 will not behave
the same way as they have done in the case of NPT once the
Treaty was signed.
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The FMCT is again a non-proliferation measure to cap
stockpiles at unequal levels targeting India, Pakistan and Israel,
more particularly India. The argument that FMCT will freeze
weapons can only apply to weapons capable states since the
P5 stockpile of weapons and fissile material is so huge that
they will be least affected. Whenever the issue of disarmament
is raised, the standard answer is that these treaties are steps
towards disarmament. However, it can be easily seen from the
track record which is so poor, that there is a risk that the P5
may not adhere to their commitments once the Treaty is signed.
Placed in a situation wherein the credibility of the P5 is in
question and the disarmament objective is a far cry, India
should reject FMCT to protect its national interests.
Benefits
(i) It will not freeze weapons in terms of numbers and would
help increasing the stockpile of fissile material.
(ii) It will be seen as a strong nation pursuing an independent
policy towards ensuring its security needs.
Risks
It could lead to further tightening of sanctions leading to
technological isolation. This could result in greater resource
demand and affect economic stability when there are several
competing demands on limited resources. Developmental
activities can also get hampered.
Maximise benefits
There has to be concerted efforts towards more efficient
performance of reprocessing plants and production of launchers.
There should be political stability and consensus on issues
related to security.
Minimise risks
(i) Instead of indulging in rhetoric, there should be a clear
strategy towards greater indigenisation in core sectors.
(ii) Pace of reforms must be accelerated so that the foreign
investments would grow and business community will
exert pressure on Governments to relax trade curbs. India’s
big market is the key and more effort should be placed on
formulating good economic statecraft.
Conclusion
This study has proceeded from the assumption that India’s
decision on the FMCT will ultimately have to strike a balance
between security, economics, international conditions, and
principle. We have attempted to consider the Indian situation
and circumstances after the May 1998 tests, while at the same
time keeping in mind the earlier and broader contexts.
Post Test Circumstances
In a fairly strong departure from the past, open and forceful
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debates on issues of national security are currently underway
and will clearly influence the final shape of any decision to be
taken. The CTBT negotiations appear to have been instrumental
in bringing the debate in India closer to a more realpolitik
perspective in contrast to the earlier normative mode in the
past. At the same time, it is important to anticipate
developments and offer possible alternative options which
would be relevant under different outcomes.
The idea of deterrence and its meaning has taken on much
more importance in the post testing period for India. In
attempting to develop the most suitable definition of minimum
deterrence, one question which needs to be considered is
whether opacity or transparency serves interests better.
Ambiguity as in the past does allow the country to maintain
credibility at undetermined levels of weaponization, thereby
avoiding a ‘tit-for-tat’ response/counter-response. On the other
hand, ironically, as a weaponised state India is coming under
increasing pressure from the U.S. to openly articulate its
strategic doctrine. It will be necessary for India to formulate
its own, perhaps unique strategic doctrine and style in the new
environment. This would not be unlike China, which from the
beginning of its weaponisation adopted a very different strategic
posture than the U.S./Russian posture. When considered against
U.S. and Russia, the Chinese are the orginators of the
“minimum deterrence” stand. India’s approach may have to
mirror the Chinese innovation in some fashion. In this
connection, the government seems to have indicated that India
does not intend to match Chinese military capability. The tests
and especially the vitriolic Chinese reaction itself may have
gone some distance in convincing skeptics about the Indian
concern regarding China over Pakistan.
Assessing the Options
None of the options considered in this report is entirely positive
or negative. The study has tried to consider the options from all
angles to give a comprehensive treatment of benefits and risks.
Without going into the details of the various options here, several
conclusions may be drawn. Option one is unlikely to have much
support in any quarter—political, scientific, strategic or even
important economic communities. Among the few supporters
may be the more internationally exposed economic agents and
companies, and political activists against the nuclear programme.
Likewise with option five, which is likely to be the most
politically attractive to international observers. It is currently
the specific option promoted by the U.S. This option will be
unpopular particularly with Indian scientists and strategic
analysts, as well as most political parties, as it would amount
to making two “unilateral” concessions without any quid pro
quo. The moratorium on fissile production would be a huge
step which would clearly restrict India’s capability to the status
quo/current levels. It would be difficult to reverse that step if
necessary to do so in the future.
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Option four suffers from some of the same problems as option
five. Besides, the status quo on the NPT will be nothing new,
and none expects it to be otherwise. On the CTBT, the
consensus seems to be toward signing at this juncture, although
there is some opposition. A question India has to answer is:
should the CTBT be allowed to become an irritant once again
in Indo-U.S. relations ? In other words, is this a battle India
wants to continue to wage at this stage ? In any case, the
policy has to become clear by September 1999 at least, but
until then there is some room for sitting on the fence.
Option three would perhaps be the most welcome from India’s
interest, particularly if the quid pro quo was substantial, such
as removing all dual use sanctions and recognition of India as
a nuclear weapon state. Under current conditions, neither
appears to be very likely, although some variant might evolve.
This leaves option two and option six as the most realistic
possibilities. These two options are attractive for quite different
reasons. Option two allows India to be engaged in negotiations
on the FMCT without fettering Indian activities in the nuclear
field in the interim. The conditions put forward by India may
be such that while no other country’s interests are likely to
coincide with India’s on all parameters, several countries’
concerns may significantly converge on one or more conditions
— allowing for potentially strong bargaining partners. Also,
while India can enter the negotiations with a number of
conditions, it should be prepared to give away the least
important ones to be able to engage in a give and take process.
With the CTBT experience behind the country, the CD should
be under no illusion that it can successfully pressure India on
its most vital conditions. In the worst case, should it become
clear that India’s critical conditions are not going to be met,
the option of withdrawing from FMCT negotiations is available,
noting that good faith negotiations by India have become
deadlocked. Option two allows India to pursue its own national
interest and be consistent with the international movement
and mood.
Option six is the one on which the P-5 will generate the
greatest ‘international’ opprobrium. There are two ways of
looking at this — one, given the post-testing sanctions regime,
there is little else with which to target and hurt India, so an
extreme position now is more tolerable from India’s perspective
than any other time. On the other hand, India also needs to try
and navigate out of the current impasse (especially in Indo-
U.S. relations) and “re-capture” non-proliferation/disarmament
“credentials.”
Views of Experts on the Options
As part of the project, a Workshop was held at NIAS, Bangalore
on 17 December 1998, to deliberate on the various options
identified in this report. Experts drawn from academia,
scientists and researchers participated in this workshop. (report
79 80
S RajagopalFissile Material Cut-off Treaty and Options for India
to be published). Participants were informed of the options,
and were requested well in advance of the Workshop to choose
the one which they consider most appropriate for India. The
outcome of the Workshop, after a presentation by various experts
as to why they chose a particular option while discarding others,
can be summarised as:
l Maximum support for option two
l Second in line support for options three and five, but with
a  recommendation against declaring a moratorium before
the Treaty takes some definite shape.
l Some support for option six
l No support for options one and four
Options discussed above can be combined to enable greater
benefits as well as to provide wider choice for negotiations.
This is illustrated in Figure-4 which is self-explanatory.
The options discussed will generally fall under two categories.
One relates to negotiating strategy at the CD, Geneva and the
other for bilateral/multilateral negotiations outside CD. For
example, option two would fall under the former category and
option three under the latter. The options can also be packaged
in such a way that it would maximise benefits for India and
nothing is given up without a substantial gain. An example of
this would be a combination of options two and three.
Negotiation on option three with the State concerned could
commence at an appropriate time depending on the details of
the content and progress of negotiations at CD.
Ultimately however, the FMCT decision has to be intimately
linked with a realistic Indian ‘strategic vision.’ Whatever
decision India takes will involve trade-offs, and this study’s
hope is that it will have contributed in making a more reasoned
and informed trade-off in the end.
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